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Close Communications: Hedge Funds, Brokers and the Emergence of Herding 
 
 
Abstract 
We examine how communication, evaluation and decision-making practices among competing market 
actors contribute to the establishment of herding and whether this has impact on market wide 
phenomena such as prices and risk. Data is collected from interviews and observations with hedge 
fund industry participants in Europe, the United States and Asia. We examine both contemporaneous 
and biographical data, finding that decision making relies on an elaborate two-tiered structure of 
connections among hedge fund managers and between them and brokers. This structure is 
underpinned by idea sharing and development between competing hedge funds leading to ‘expertise-
based’ herding and an increased probability of over-embeddedness. We subsequently present a case 
study demonstrating the role that communication between competing hedge funds plays in the 
creation of herding and show that such trades affect prices by introducing an additional risk: the 
disregarding of information from sources outside the trusted connections. 
 
Introduction  
As seen most notably in the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008, unstable financial markets can have 
a detrimental impact on today’s economy and society. Amongst a variety of explanations for such 
instability (Stein, 2015), a contributing factor is often thought to be herding among market 
participants. In the context of markets, herding commonly refers to several actors making the same 
investment decision either at the same time or in close succession, leading to high concentration of 
similar market orders and higher risks. Although there is much empirical evidence of the existence of 
herding in the finance literature (Jiao and Ye, 2014), there are few explorations of the possible 
underlying social and organizational practices through which herding in financial markets may come 
about. In particular, the rich conceptualization that evolved in the management and economic 
sociology literatures around the notion of embeddedness (e.g. Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996, 1997; 
Ingram and Roberts, 2000; Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003) has not been utilized effectively. Motivated by 
this apparent gap in empirical knowledge and conceptualization, in this paper we analyze 
communication and information-sharing practices among financial organizations and use this 
qualitative empirical examination to contribute to a theory on the conditions that enable and frame 
collaborative decision-making between managers in these competing organizations and, under certain 
conditions, contribute to the emergence of herding. 
Our data is drawn from hedge funds, a sector that is often considered emblematic of the 
financial industry. Hedge funds, although often managing billions of dollars in assets are typically 
‘boutique’, small in terms of employees. However, like other larger financial market participants such 
as investment banks or mutual funds, these small firms are faced with an almost limitless opportunity 
set of assets to trade. How do they gain information, interrogate possibilities and make decisions? 
Social and organizational research in other contexts would suggest that these competitors may 
communicate closely (Ingram and Roberts, 2000; Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003). If they do, does this 
contribute to herding and subsequently, effects on market wide measures such as prices and risk?   
The qualitative empirical material was collected through interviews with a large number of 
hedge fund professionals and field visits to hedge funds and brokerage firms. We corroborate the 
qualitative empirical findings by constructing a map of the interactions-based connections, analyzing 
them in the light of the institutional, biographical-historical and geographical data collected, and 
calculating the relevant social network measures. Finally, to illustrate the impact of communication 
practices, over-embeddedness and its outcomes, we study a single trading position held by a number 
of connected firms, over a period of several months. By combining these three modes of investigation 
we aim to capture more comprehensively than previous research the multifaceted nature of the 
phenomenon of investment-related communication among professional financial investors.  
To understand the communication practices among competing hedge funds we first appeal to 
Podolny (2001) and, in particular, the uncertainties around both market opportunities and the quality 
of other actors, that drive the use of selective, close-knit ties. The shared and repeated analysis of 
information that takes place between such ties motivated us to regard this conceptually as ‘expertise-
based’ herding, where actors who consider each other ‘smart’ adopt similar trades. Additionally, the 
seminal work initiated by Uzzi (1996) and Uzzi and Lancaster (2003) suggests that the structure of 
connections among economic actors can also become over-embedded, whereby a limited set of ideas 
is circulated among close ties. This can adversely affect the actors through their exposure to a limited 
information set leading to insulated and potentially risky decision making. We argue that the effects 
of the sociological concept of over-embeddedness can be extended into financial market theory, as 
tightly grouped hedge funds underweight relevant information about prices and risk from sources 
outside the trusted connections.    
The remaining parts of the paper are divided into seven sections: Section 2 considers the 
literature on communication and herding in financial markets, whilst section 3 provides an overview 
of the hedge fund industry and likely social connections. Section 4 presents methods and data. Section 
5 uses interviews and field observations to explore communication practices whilst section 6 provides 
the historical-biographical origins of hedge funds’ communication practices. Section 7 examines the 
emergence of herding and wider market risks and finally, section 8 provides a discussion and 
conclusion. 
 
Communication and herding in financial markets 
To begin our explanation of herding in financial markets we turn first to the organizational literature 
that has explored the conditions that affect communication and decision-making amongst participants 
in markets per se. An important notion is that economic activity is embedded in pre-existing networks 
of social ties (Baker, 1984; Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996, 1997), where exchange of information 
(Ingram and Roberts, 2000) and organizational learning (Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003) take place. In 
addition to social connections, the widespread adoption of similar trading software and financial 
models (Zaloom, 2003; Callon & Muniesa, 2005) may serve as conduit for imitation between 
different investors, thus increasing the homogeneity of views in financial markets (MacKenzie, 2003; 
Beunza and Stark, 2012).  
By contrast with its organizational counterpart, the mainstream finance literature has 
examined investor behavior such as herding by focusing on prices or trades and then, via some 
quantitative approach, noted whether these are consistent with investor rationality. For example, a 
body of work has observed correlated trades and subsequently suggested that investors herd because 
they have access to the same public information or they infer useful information from each others’ 
trading patterns or they mimic others’ trades for reputational and benchmarking concerns 
(Lakonishock et al., 1992; Grinblatt et al., 1995; Graham, 1999; Sias, 2004; Boyson, 2010). However, 
finance literature pays little attention to the possible social mechanisms behind herding. Exceptions 
include Hong et al. (2005) and Cohen et al. (2008, 2010) who examine the trading behavior of 
professional money managers and find that such behavior statistically co-varies more positively when 
managers are (i) located in the same city and (ii) attended college together and imply 
contemporaneous social connections between financial decision makers. Indeed, Colla and Mele 
(2010) construct a theoretical model with heterogeneous information linkages that affect the 
correlatedness of trades. However, without adopting a qualitative approach it is difficult to directly 
assess the existence, type and effect of communication between market participants. 
Our decision to choose hedge funds as a site for examining communication and decision 
making and as a potential ‘breeding ground’ for herding is motivated by three factors. First, it is 
important to understand how hedge fund managers make decisions because of the influence that these 
organizations have on markets and beyond. For instance, recent finance literature (Singleton, 2014) 
found that hedge fund trading positions can influence global commodity prices, which, in turn, impact 
domestic fuel prices. Similarly, a 2014 survey (Tower Watson, 2014) found that a growing share of 
pension fund assets are managed by hedge funds. Second, there is empirical quantitative evidence of 
herding in the hedge fund sector (Boyson, 2010) and its wider effects. For example, Jiao and Ye 
(2014) show that mutual funds herd in response to hedge fund herding and the trading actions of these 
large mutual funds cause prices to move away from fair values and leads to additional market 
volatility. Third, and in direct relation to our intention to develop theory about the organizational 
underpinning of herding, research indicates that recruitment of managers in hedge funds follows a 
mentoring ‘lineage’ pattern, whereby a manager provides initial financial and professional support to 
traders once the latter begin their own funds. This lineage pattern contributes to the spread of similar 
investment strategies and the establishment of strong connections among hedge fund of ‘different 
generations’ (Choi, 2011) and may contribute to contagion among the funds (Boyson et al., 2010).  
 
The hedge fund industry  
A hedge fund is a pooled investment vehicle that is privately organized, administered by professional 
investment managers and not widely available to the public (President’s Working Group on Financial 
Markets, 1999). Due to their private nature, hedge funds have less restrictions on the use of leverage, 
short-sales
1
 and derivatives, than more regulated vehicles such as mutual funds. Maslakovic (2008) 
estimates from January 1998 till January 2008 global assets under management grew tenfold from 
$221 billion to $2.25 trillion. Currently, assets under management stand at approximately $3.13 
trillion (Evestment, 2015) with the most popular locations for funds including New York and London.  
To explain the main industry and organizational actors, note that hedge funds are typically 
small, each employing up to 20 people. Hedge fund managers are the most central functionaries in the 
organization and are commonly founders and partners to the initial capital collected during the setup 
of the fund. This function’s centrality is also reflected in the decision making process. Almost without 
exception, the hedge fund managers we examined made the final decisions on the composition of the 
fund’s portfolio. Hedge fund managers are often assisted by analysts2 (i.e., ‘buy-side analysts’). The 
main task of analysts is to develop investment ideas through the assessment of the countries, 
industries, sectors or companies on which they focus.  
Brokerage firms, with which hedge funds interact, typically execute trading orders for hedge 
funds and may also provide additional capital to leverage market positions or purchase requested 
assets. The initial contact person for the hedge fund is the salesperson and our interviewees frequently 
referred to these salespersons as ‘brokers.’ A broker will frequently provide the hedge fund with 
initial investment ideas from in-house analysts and may also organize meetings between hedge fund 
managers and executives from various companies or institutional investors, an activity known as 
‘corporate access’. They also provide the funds with ‘flow information,’ descriptive information about 
the conditions surrounding a possible investment action. For example, whether there are more buyers 
than sellers for certain assets, the type of institutions that are interested in buying or selling, and the 
                                                 
1
 A short sale is a common practice where the hedge fund borrows a stock anticipating that it will drop in price. 
They subsequently sell the shares and then return the borrowed shares by buying new shares in the market at the 
lower price (i.e., a price lower than the borrowed shares). In this manner, the hedge fund makes money and the 
owner of the stock makes money by loaning shares. 
2
 The hedge fund managers we observed and interviewed each had between one and four analysts assisting 
them. 
magnitude of specific orders. Finally, traders in brokerage firms are responsible for the actual 
execution of trading orders on behalf of the brokerage firm’s clients.  
Given the above, in terms of social connections we shall investigate two types of 
relationships. The first, given its clear operational requirement, are hedge fund manager and broker 
ties. The second are ties between hedge fund managers across different firms. Although this latter tie 
indicates communication between competitors
3
, both empirical (Ingram and Roberts, 2000) and 
theoretical work (Stein, 2008) suggest this possibility.  For example, Stein’s model implies that actors 
will communicate with each other if the expected payoff of collaboration outweighs any prior 
competitive advantage. This type of mutual co-operation assumes reciprocity to be suitably beneficial 
in a narrow financial sense and involves the exchange of a single trading idea between two bilateral 
partners. However, reciprocity can also be expressed through non-financial remuneration. In 
particular, we would posit that factors - such as legitimization or confirmation - are likely to be a 
significant motivation for conversation(s). Hong et al. (2000) suggest that inexperienced financial 
analysts avoid making bold forecasts to lessen the probability of making large errors. They argue that 
giving a forecast closer to the average enables the analyst to ‘legitimize’ the prediction to internal 
colleagues and in particular, superiors. Analogously, experienced hedge fund managers may seek 
‘confirmation’ from a trusted peer group of competing managers that the proposed trade is without 
obvious flaw and recent work (Boyson, 2010) has shown that to maintain reputation, senior hedge 
fund managers are even more likely to herd than more junior counterparts.  
The suggestions above can be further enriched by theory that argues the existence (or 
absence) of ties between market actors is not only important for the actors who are party to the ties, 
but is also an important source of information for other actors, as it indicates of the quality of the 
actors (Podolny, 2001). More generally, knowledge about the social structure itself is an important 
source for generating knowledge about the market. This theory finds empirical support in works by 
Sorenson and Stuart (2001), Owen-Smith and Powell (2004) and Hochberg and Ljungqvist (2007). On 
                                                 
3
 When asked who their competitors were, hedge fund managers typically cited other hedge fund managers 
(some also mentioned the market as a whole as their competitor). A possible rationale for competitiveness 
among hedge funds is provided by Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2009) who show that hedge funds with good 
recent performance experience relatively higher money inflows.  
the basis of these findings, we see the notion of trust as related to the interpretations actors generate 
using their observed networks. In particular, we theorize that a hedge fund manager will tend to 
follow other actors perceived to be of significant quality. 
As a final theoretical prop for the likelihood of hedge fund manager to manager connections, 
we suggest that hedge funds face a large ‘decision space.’ By decision space, we refer to the 
topography that is described by the possible choices available, the frequency that decisions can be 
made at and the importance of those decisions. Typically, a professional financial manager in a 
trading firm faces a very different decision space than the industrial/service firms predominantly 
studied in the sociological literature.
4
 Within the financial market environment, decisions are dynamic 
and any particular decision to trade can be unwound (or canceled) in any particular future moment. 
This is because financial markets are relatively liquid and therefore decisions can be made at 
exceptionally frequent intervals. Indeed not closing a trade, when a position is open, is still a decision 
that needs to be taken at least daily. Moreover, financial markets contain thousands of assets, so the 
decision space that professional financial managers face is large. This large decision space, or hyper-
decision making environment, brings with it the need for more frequent information and perhaps 
additional reassurance/confirmation from the directly connected and observed others that make up the 
fund manager’s trusted social structure.  
 
Methods and data  
Our interviews and field work took place between December 2007 and June 2009. Similarly to 
Knights and McCabe (2015), this period covered the volatile market events of the GFC and, as such, 
provided ample opportunities to study how hedge fund managers make critical investment decisions. 
Individual hedge funds typically specialize in one investment strategy. Our sample selection is 
motivated primarily by our intention to focus on hedged funds that use strategies known as ‘long-
short’ or ‘event-driven’. Long-short hedge funds invest by taking positions in different groups of 
                                                 
4
 For example, consider the garment manufacturers examined by Uzzi (1997). Once an order is agreed from 
clothing retailer, the manufacturer faces fairly standard purchasing choices around amount and type of material. 
However, the original decision to transact with a specific retailer is static, and barring a break in contract, the 
order will be delivered. In that sense, the decision space is small and as such, a narrow selection of important 
choices are decided at relatively infrequent intervals. 
assets, taking a long position (buying and holding) in one asset and a short position (borrowing – 
using credit from a prime broker – and selling) in another. Event-driven hedge funds choose their 
targets of investment based on the announcement and materialization of certain events (e.g., a 
merger/acquisition or an asset sale after bankruptcy procedures). Three reasons underpin our choice to 
study hedge funds that use these strategies. The first is our focus on the evolving dynamics of 
communication among investment professionals, which is illustrated clearly by ‘long-short’ and 
‘event-driven’ investment strategies. Hedge fund managers who employ these strategies hold market 
positions for weeks and even months, during which the positions may be unprofitable. Secondly, both 
strategies typify elements that distinguish hedge funds from most other investment vehicles: their 
ability to go short and their focus on arbitrage-like opportunities and thirdly, Smith (2011) shows that 
these are two of the most popular styles among hedge funds. 
Following our intention to contribute to theory, we selected our data collection methods with 
the dual intention to document practices related to decision-making and to depict the dynamics around 
the establishment and use of meaningful connections for the actors. We do so by focusing on the 
production of meanings by the actors. That is, motivating us was the aim to understand what matters 
to hedge fund managers and brokers as they communicate and made decisions (Rynes and Gephart, 
2004; Fuller and Lewis, 2002).
5
 To do so, we devised a particular set of questions for the hedge fund 
managers and for the brokers, based on the different settings.  In our analysis, we identified actor-
presented themes in the data, which we developed as distinct categories related to practices and 
norms. We then cross-referenced this data between different informants in order to increase the 
accuracy and rigour of our findings. Many of the interviews’ questions were aimed, in both the case of 
the hedge fund managers and the brokers to capture the names of people with whom they have 
relevant professional interactions. In the interviews we defined ‘relevant’ for hedge fund managers as: 
a connection with a person that ‘has influence on the investment decision, be it directly through idea 
sharing, or indirectly through second opinion or selective contribution’; whilst for brokers it was 
                                                 
5
 This focus on the actors’ interpretative dimension of activities is one of the hallmarks of grounded theory, but 
we want to stress that while this is a leading motivation in our choice of methodology, we do not subscribe fully 
to the grounded theory approach (we thank one of the anonymous reviewers for highlighting this point to us).    
defined as: ‘hedge fund managers a) with whom you consider to have a good relationship, and b) 
would belong to your top 20 clients or top client list, if you would have one’.  
The dataset we compiled is the first of its kind in terms of scope of coverage. We sampled 36 
hedge fund professionals and 24 representatives of the brokerage side whom we interviewed and 
observed. We employed purposive and snowball sampling (Morse, 2010) using information from 
interviews to identify and contact other potential informants. The size of the sample represents the 
hedge funds and brokerage firms in the long-short and event-driven strategies (i.e., active in these 
strategies or operating on behalf of such actors) who were willing to participate in the research and, in 
the case of hedge funds, had assets of at least USD 5 billion under their management. The hedge 
funds in our sample represented the largest 20% of funds in these strategies and in total, managed 
15% of hedge funds’ assets under management globally.6 Interviews were conducted in New York, 
Hong Kong, London, Geneva, Madrid and a fourth European city that cannot be identified because of 
anonymity considerations. Brokers were interviewed on the basis that their services were used by at 
least one of the hedge funds in our dataset. All interviews were recorded and transcribed, and were 
conducted on the basis of strict anonymity and confidentiality. In addition to the interviews, 
observatory fieldwork was conducted at eight hedge funds and two brokerage firms. The observations 
were held typically in blocks of two to five days and, where possible, were repeated at different times 
throughout the working day. At our request, a rotation system
7
 was organized and some informal 
‘debriefing’ sessions were held outsides the offices of the hedge fund or brokerage firm (often held at 
coffee shops or at a local bar) to follow up issues that were raised during the observations.  
When designing and conducting our interviews, we followed the ‘semi-structured’ approach 
(see Creswell, 2008). We defined in advance topics that would be examined during the interview. 
These topics are: daily routines in the hedge fund, practices related to portfolio decisions, 
communication with persons outside the fund, educational and occupational history of the 
interviewee, cultural and national background and their social cycle of friends and acquaintances. All 
                                                 
6
 As of Dec. 31, 2007, Barclay hedge alternative investment databases. 
7
 Rotations consisted of spending between a half a day and two days with different professionals at a same firm. 
The purpose of this was three–fold: 1) understanding how the different functions interact, 2) observing what 
information is shared and 3) triangulation of questioning. 
topics were explored in the interviews, but we allowed specific questions to be determined according 
to the context in which the topic was raised in the conversation. Field visits and interviews were 
chosen as the main tool of data collection because our pilot interviews and site visits indicated that 
portfolio decision making in hedge funds typically takes place primarily during face-to-face meetings 
and telephone conversations.  
Based on the data collected in the interviews and observations, we also constructed a network 
of the connections among hedge fund managers and between them and brokers. Towards the end of 
our data collection period we verified again, through follow up communication with interviewees, that 
the connections we identified during the interviews were still valid. In the mapping, only connections 
for which we could establish independent confirmation from both parties that both saw each other as 
significant participants in portfolio decisions were considered. Here we followed the empiricist 
approach to network construction, according to which, the network boundary is defined by recording 
the parties who interact with each other in a certain context (Kossinets, 2008). In this case, the 
relevant context is discussion about portfolio decisions. In addition, due to resource constraints, we 
bounded the network by tracing only the immediate connections of each of the managers and the 
brokers (Marsden, 1990).  
Table 1: Summary data characteristics 
Sample Full sample Included in 
network 
No. of observations 60 25 
No. of managers 36 20 
No. of brokers 24 5 
Age range of participants (yrs) 30-53 30-48 
Average age of participants (yrs) 38.3 39.8 
Std. dev age of participants (yrs) 5.2 4.4 
Average time in industry (yrs) 11.7 13.4 
Std dev. of time in industry (yrs) 4.7 4.1 
 
Table 1 shows summary characteristics for our data. Consider first that the age range of all 
participants ranged from thirty to early-fifties, they had worked in the financial industry for an 
average of almost 12 years and that the vast majority were men
8
. Overall, from the 60 people 
interviewed and observed, 74 meaningful communication connections were established, distributed 
over 25 people who also agreed to provide information about their past employment and their 
personal connections. Of these actors, five worked on the brokerage side
9
 and 20 in hedge funds (14 
in London, three in New York, one in Geneva and two in the European city).
10
. Finally, note that 
seven nationalities were involved including participants from the US, the UK and continental Europe.  
 
Communicative practices between hedge funds and brokers and among hedge funds  
Communication between hedge funds and brokers  
Hedge fund managers seeking flow information constituted the most frequent type of phone calls or 
emails that brokers received from hedge funds during our observations. Such requests for information 
were followed up, typically, by brokers conducting some investigation and returning with specific 
details. For example, manager
11
 H17 was developing an investment idea that included buying 
Telefónica
12
 stock, and telephoned a local broker who possessed ‘a good understanding of the 
intentions of major holders in the stock’.13 The broker14 (BR7), contacted his Madrid connections and 
subsequently provided an assessment of the aspirations of significant stock holders augmented with 
current information about buying and selling activity in Telefónica stock. Flow information, in the 
words of H9, is ‘not found on the tape’; that is, not included in the price and volume information.  
The popularity of flow information in communication between hedge funds and brokers is 
explained by their respective interests. Hedge funds are eager to learn about the identity and intentions 
of other actors with whom they share the market and brokers, who know that such information may 
lead to more trade orders, aim to provide the information. In addition, hedge funds rely on the 
superior variety of connections that brokers have and use them, in effect, as their ‘ears and eyes in the 
                                                 
8
 The methodology led to three women being sampled.   
9
 The brokers examined are all Managing Directors at their firms and responsible for the coverage of hedge 
funds managers, communicating on a daily basis. As we have noted elsewhere, hedge fund managers were 
responsible for the final decision over portfolio investments for their fund.  
10
 We identified only one broker-broker connection in our network, as was also indicated in our qualitative data. 
Hence, the questions to brokers referred, in effect, to their connections with hedge fund managers. 
11
  Hereafter, a hedge fund manager will be denoted by the generic symbol H and a specific number, e.g., H17. 
12
 The Spanish multinational company whose stock is traded in the Bolsa de Madrid. 
13
 Text in italics and contained within single quotation marks represents transcribed speech from interviews. 
14
 Hereafter, a broker will be denoted by the generic symbol BR and a specific number, e.g., BR7. 
market’, as H2 expressed. However, information quality is a diminishing function of the frequency 
that brokers attempt to contact managers; and it was clearly apparent in our observations that brokers 
initiate communication with hedge funds (via unsolicited phone calls, emails or an instant message 
such as Figure 1) at a much higher rate than the latter seek their information. Indeed, it was not 
uncommon to see hedge fund managers deleting such messages after looking at them very briefly or 
even without reading them. At times, the hedge fund would call the broker asking if a certain flow 
indicated by the latter was ‘real’ or if they were just ‘fishing’ for a client order.  
Figure 1: Instant message from broker to hedge fund manager 
 
 
Notes: Figure 1 shows a Bloomberg screenshot of an instant message from a broker to H7 showing 
the distribution of general, low quality information, hoping to attract customers. Also, confidentiality 
restrictions prevent brokers from revealing identities, hence the cryptic language (‘desert names’, 
which can be sovereign wealth funds or perhaps oil companies, ‘custodials’, which are often pension 
funds).  
Another common topic of communication involves investment ideas, H9 explains: ‘The way I 
see brokers is a process of scanning for money making ideas. That is basically what you pay for. You 
pay for research where they scan companies and they filter all the valuation cases for you.’ This view 
is prevalent among hedge funds and supported by an economic infrastructure. As brokers and hedge 
fund managers alike explained, providing investment ideas allows brokers to generate fees, because it 
is expected that the hedge fund will execute trades via the broker who suggested the relevant strategy. 
The importance of investment ideas to generate higher fees was clearly stated by our interviewees. It 
was explained that in present market conditions, brokers that did not supply high fee-paying 
customers were being dismissed.  
Taken as a whole, the set of behavioral conventions described above shows that brokers are 
motivated to create and maintain communicative connections with as many hedge funds as possible, 
but not with other brokers. It should be noted that although these numerous connections serve as the 
basis for generating revenue for the brokerage firm, they directly impact on the quality of information 
hedge funds share with brokers. To explain, consider that whilst hedge fund managers were eager to 
learn about other hedge funds activities, the informing brokers were also castigated for their ‘parasitic 
behavior’, a pejorative derived from broker practices of widely disseminating information. H16 and 
H2, senior hedge fund managers at two of the largest hedge funds globally, comment respectively: 
H16 - ‘The sales side people [brokers] are just desperate to print tickets. They do not care 
how [or] who with and so if they hear a good story [i.e. an interesting idea] - I mean they are 
starving for stories, they pass it on.’  
H2 - ‘In general they are good people, but you should be wary of them. They engage in what I 
call parasitic behavior. They try to know or understand what we do. Once they do, they will 
use that to generate business from another hedge fund. At the same time, they will tell me what 
other strategies or other hedge funds are doing.’  
Although the quotations above reflect expressions of restrained relationships, we also observed that 
brokers and hedge fund managers often spoke several times a day, dined together and shared pastime 
activities such as attending sporting events. However, when we asked senior salespeople in brokerage 
houses and hedge fund managers to describe the closeness of the relationships, they opined that most 
connections were governed by the ‘business reality’ (T4). In particular, this meant that the frequency 
of social engagements represented the level of commissions paid and that crucially, hedge funds only 
divulged to brokers lower quality information that could be disseminated widely.  
 
Connections among hedge funds  
All the hedge fund managers we observed and interviewed employ analogous strategies and therefore 
compete for capital and return-generating ideas. Despite this competition, a salient characteristic of 
the daily routines of most observed managers is communication with other managers employing the 
same strategy. Such communication is frequent; for example, H9 programmed the phone numbers of 
four competing hedge fund managers into his speed-dial phone system. Our observations reveal that 
this is not exceptional and that hedge fund managers typically speak several times a day with one or 
more of their competitors.  
Importantly, communication between managers continues throughout the investment 
decision-making cycle; potential investment ideas are discussed pre-trade, reports are shared on the 
success or failure of existing positions and finally, internal information related to the running of the 
fund is divulged. H7 commented on the basis for such frequent contacts: ‘I know those people from 
working in the same financial institutions. One guy that I know is head of a very, very big American 
hedge fund. He used to be a proprietary trader ten years ago and a colleague of mine.’  
Whilst common biographical history, as we also discuss in the next section, serves as a basis 
for the connections, a strong norm of informational reciprocity also affects the communicative 
connection. Investment ideas and insights are shared with the expectation that the ‘acquirer’ of 
information will ‘pay back’ the favor in the form of offering insights or information of their own. H15 
explains: ‘You try to share information and ideas. It is reciprocity, actually. You will not keep those 
people as friends if you don’t have something else to offer.’  
Information sharing among hedge funds, unlike communication between hedge funds and 
brokers, also includes an important interpretative dimension, which leads, frequently to collaborative 
generation of knowledge. Specifically, hedge fund managers expect other managers with whom they 
share information to offer insights, commentary or criticism during the discussions. We witnessed 
many conversations focusing on specific issues relevant to trading positions; issues such as 
composition of boards of directors, product strategies or implications of regional law. In almost all of 
these exchanges, whether face-to-face, by phone or email, the goal of the conversations was not to 
discover a new trading opportunity but to scrutinize existing or contemplated investment ideas.  
The exchange of high-quality information between hedge funds is emphasized by noting that 
although brokerage firms have their own expert-analysts, the hedge fund managers we observed 
clearly preferred to approach another competing fund when a difficult question arose about a trading 
position. H11 offers an explanation for this preference. When asked about evaluating the probability 
of two companies merging, a position being examining at the time, H11 commented: ‘I just do not 
want to be wasting time but I think analysts [in brokerage houses], they sometimes simplify their job a 
lot…They will, say, put a 50-50 probability on it [the event] and that gives them a target [price], 
because that just simplifies their life…But if I speak to someone else who is an event-driven investor, 
they will have done a hell of a lot of work on that. They will have spoken to lawyers and spoken to 
advisers and spoken to consultants because that is what we focus on. This changes the probabilities. 
That is just very different from putting 50-50 on it.’ 
The motivation to examine and reexamine the trading ideas and in doing so to add new layers 
of interpretation to a contemplated or existing trade, supports the development and maintenance of 
close-knit groups within which hedge fund managers share information. It is rare, we witnessed, that a 
hedge fund manager considers it sufficient to consult only one other competitor. Instead, the manager 
would contact a second and frequently even a third competitor, sharing some of the earlier 
information in an attempt to develop a comprehensive view on the relevant trade. The choices of 
partners to this information-sharing, however is limited by the typical reliance of hedge fund 
managers on positive past acquaintance as a pre-condition for communication and this strict 
selectivity results in small groups within which information-sharing takes place.  
Managers frequently used the word 'trust' to describe the general set of conditions without 
which relationships involving the reciprocal exchange of interpretive information were not likely to 
develop. This empirical finding corresponds with studies (Williams, 2001; McEvily et al., 2003; 
Schoorman et al., 2007) about trust and the role it plays in other organizations. We identify two 
dimensions of trust required to be present to establish communication, each relating directly to the 
practices we observed. Firstly, a manager must trust the competence of the competitor. H24 noted: ‘I 
trust their opinion about stocks. I have had recently a situation where we were short one stock and the 
guy at [name of a competing hedge fund] was long. So we met up inside our offices with him to 
discuss why we had different opinions about the stock. He is very smart, so I wanted to pick his brains 
and share my views to see who was missing what.’ This exchange, typical of many of the discussions 
among hedge fund actors, lasted approximately two hours; both participants gaining new perspectives 
regarding their trading positions and resulting, eventually, in collaborative decision making. 
The second dimension of trust we encountered related to the faith a manager places in the 
integrity of the competitor. We heard the phrases ‘integrity’, ‘a shared set of values’ and ‘honesty’ 
being used when managers expressed their belief that others in their close-knit groups would not 
abuse the sensitive information given through the sharing practices. When asked about instances 
where other managers did misuse shared information, it was obvious that the topic made our 
interviewees uneasy and they were reluctant to proceed. However, in one conversation at the end of a 
trading day, a hedge fund was mentioned that used its connections to spread false rumors and inflate 
prices. Our source noted that there were consequences to such capricious behavior: ‘Everyone knows 
about them and now no one talks to them’.  
 
The historical-biographical origins of hedge funds’ communication practices  
The network of the connections between hedge funds and brokers is presented diagrammatically in 
Figure 2, with related descriptive statistics in Table 2. In the figure, the five brokers are displayed by 
five circles placed in a horizontal line at the upper-middle part of the figure. Hedge fund managers are 
represented by squares; those specializing in event driven strategies are represented by black squares 
and are placed above the line of brokers. Managers specializing in long-short strategies are 
represented by grey squares and positioned below the brokers. The size of the node represents its 
betweenness centrality
15
.  
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 The measure of betweenness centrality is based on the number of shortest paths between pairs of nodes in the 
network on which the measured node is located. The rationale behind the measure is that the more such shortest 
Figure 2: The network of hedge fund managers and brokers 
Notes: The node’s shape represents its role (e.g., circles are brokers and squares are hedge fund 
managers). The node’s colour represents its dominating strategy (e.g., grey is long-short and black is 
event driven). The node’s size represents its betweeness centrality. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive network statistics 
 Average 
degree 
Average aggregate 
dyadic constraint 
Average 
betweeness 
centrality 
Average 
eigenvector 
centrality 
Brokers 9.40 0.215 34.83 0.24 
Hedge fund managers 5.05 0.473 6.940 0.17 
 
Eyeballing the figure shows that brokers
16
 typically have more connections and despite their small 
number they are instrumental in holding the network in one large component. Hedge fund managers, 
                                                                                                                                                        
paths ‘cross’ the measured actor, the more brokerage opportunities are available to the actor. Eigenvector 
centrality computes recursively the centrality of the node’s neighbors. A node would score higher according to 
this measure if its direct neighbors (and their neighbors and so on) are centrality located within the network 
(Freeman 1977, 1979). 
16
 Our interview questions were primarily aimed at capturing hedge fund to hedge fund and hedge fund to 
broker ties. However, we also have qualitative evidence, that broker-to-broker connections are exceptional. For 
example, BR7, a broker, told us that he found out that a hedge fund was using his investment ideas, but executed 
the trades through a cheaper broker. BR7 learned about this because the broker who executed the trades was his 
good friend and shared this information. BR7 emphasised that it was highly exceptional that a broker would 
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on the other hand, appear to be part of higher density patterns of connections. This is reflected by the 
measures in Table 2, indicating that brokers have, on average, approximately twice as many direct 
connections (or ‘degrees’) and half the level of dyadic constraint17 as hedge fund managers. Brokers 
are therefore less constrained by virtue of being often connected to actors that are not directly 
connected to each other. The higher betweenness centrality statistic testifies that brokers ‘hold the 
network together’ and that their removal would disintegrate the network into separate components.   
The qualitative and network evidence thus far both suggest that decision-making in the hedge 
fund industry relies on an elaborate two-tiered structure of connections. In particular, that brokers aim 
to have several connections with hedge fund managers, as these connections provide opportunities for 
generating fees, whilst hedge fund managers tend to be selective and maintain clusters of densely 
connected and trusted actors. This picture will now be further reinforced by our investigation into the 
origins of the contemporaneous connections, which further shows that ties between hedge fund 
managers are underpinned by factors such as prior working experience, mentoring, perceived 
smartness and common language backgrounds.  
To begin, consider Figure 3 which shows an enlarged view of the single triad H16-H9-H6 from our 
full network diagram; three managers trading a long-short strategy. Next to each node (represented in 
squares) is a key representing the nationality, seniority and city base of the hedge fund manager. In 
the case of seniority, the higher the numerical value, the more senior the hedge fund manager. 
Superimposed over the lines of connection is information relating to the relationship between the two 
connected managers, as it was reported independently by the managers. This information covers (i) an 
assessment of the intensity of the relationship: low, medium or high (ii) whether they have worked 
previously together in the same firm (iii) when they met (iv) whether they socialize: no, sometimes or 
regularly and (v) whether a mentoring relationship exists? The direction of the arrowhead indicates 
                                                                                                                                                        
share such information with another broker. For expositional purposes, we have indicted this single broker-to- 
broker tie in Figure 2. 
17
 The measure of dyadic constraint is based on the triads to which the measured actor belongs. Complete triads 
impose a constraint on the actors connected (i.e., no actor can broker between the other two), whilst an 
incomplete triad enables one actor to gain a potential brokerage opportunity (i.e., as that actor connects the two 
others). The aggregate constraint is the sum of the dyadic constraints for an actor as a result of the actor’s 
membership in triads, weighted by the importance of the connections. According to this rationale, a low dyadic 
constraint is related to increased brokerage opportunities (Burt, 1992; Breiger, 2004).  
which manager has reported to typically make initial contact about an information exchange. This 
information was also corroborated independently by the managers.  
Figure 3: ‘Past mentoring’ triad 
 
 
Now all working at different firms, the three hedge managers, like many others we examined 
worked together previously and now they communicate frequently about work issues and socialize 
regularly. H9 has less experience than both H6 and H16 and very much looks up to them. Both H6 
and H16 provide mentoring to H9. During the time we spent with H9, he worked on two trading ideas 
and discussed them with H6 who did not think them worth pursuing. In both cases H9 abandoned the 
ideas. In contrast, during one of those calls, H6 suggested to H9 to examine the relationship between 
the price behavior of a holding group and a bank in which the holding group had a substantial stake, 
as a basis for a possible long-short trader. Following this conversation, H9 immediately began 
gathering information on both companies and analyzed several related charts on his terminal. This 
example indicates that elements in the hedge fund managers' biographical history (and, in particular, 
past organizational status differentials) affect their current decision-making practices by directing and 
framing topics that are deemed suitable for analysis as potential trading ideas. Also, given that the 
managers had known each other for at least eight years at the time of the interviews (and in the other 
case, more than 13 years), this example shows us the power of the social connections: for H9, even 
after all these years, H6 and H16 were still the 'go to' people when he needed advice about investment 
ideas.  
Figure 4 shows the triad H20-H17-H24; this is an interesting case as the managers connect 
despite H20 specializing in a different investment strategies from H17 and H24.  
Figure 4: ‘Smartness, education and language’ triad 
 
Moreover, as can be seen in Figure 4, two pairs in the triad (i.e. H20-H17 and H24-H20) have not 
worked together previously. What is driving the information-sharing and connections here? In 
particular, the H20-H17 pair stands out as it represents a ‘high-intensity’ relationship. They met when 
a mutual business contact, a broker of the same nationality, introduced them in 2002. Getting on well 
and speaking the same language in a foreign country appear to be part of the attraction. However, in 
addition to the cultural affinity, the primary driver for the connection they reported on was their view 
on one another that other manager is ‘smart’. For example, H20 values the opinion and interpretation 
from H17 who he sees as “very street-smart”, and as “an authentic thinker who always says what he 
really thinks.” H20, for his part, thinks H17 is “very, very smart” and values his academic approach. 
In one example we observed the pair discussing the appropriate valuation of a large media company. 
H20 was using a contemporary Private Equity model and H17 asked him to email his valuation 
spreadsheet and to telephone him back to discuss it. Subsequently, H17, who has been longer in the 
business, shared his view based on a more ‘traditional’ valuation approach. Interestingly, similar 
educational background does not help explain the H20-H17 connection. Perhaps unsurprisingly, H17 
comes from a far more classically academic education. In fact in this case, one might argue that it is 
the differing educational backgrounds, informing the different valuation approaches, that are a 
significant part of the attraction.  
As these examples above and several others omitted for space reasons have shown, factors 
such as proximity of role whilst working together, mentoring, smartness, language also play 
significant roles for the maintenance and continuity of ties and consequently in the decision-making 
process. 
 
The emergence of herding and market-wide risks 
How might the two-tiered structure of connections in the hedge fund industry and the related 
communication practices shown above give rise to herding? In our fieldwork, we noticed that hedge 
fund managers and brokers frequently referred to certain trading positions as ‘consensus trades’. 
Moreover, numerous hedge fund managers commented that at any given time they and other hedge 
funds they know hold such consensus trades – trading positions that are similar or even identical. 
Asking about the origins of trading ideas that become 'consensual', several interviewees relate the 
phenomenon to common educational and professional background. As BR3 explains: ‘It is a small 
village. What is interesting is at the end of the day, we all come from a similar background, we 
probably studied very similar things and often have worked together doing valuations or what have 
you together, using the same models. You probably have a big chance that you are going to look at 
similar things in a similar way, so you come to the same conclusion in a similar timeframe.’ 
This quote corresponds with findings we present earlier about the role that common 
educational and occupational backgrounds play in decision-making. However, while the inception of 
similar trading is rooted in the past, their development is dependent on the existence of contemporary 
information-sharing among hedge fund managers, as this description from Prime Broker PBS1 
indicates: ‘Yes, there are many people that have similar kind of trades. There is a certain universe of 
consensus trades, everyone has those trades... Because if one hedge fund manager knows that 
something is cheap he is likely to let another hedge fund manager know it is cheap. People share 
information, especially among hedge funds.’  
The quote above describes generally the steps that lead to the emergence of consensus trades. 
However, focusing specifically on how consensus trades come about, we observed their relation to 
communication practices. For example, we received the following description from H9: ‘In general, I 
would say that it starts with an idea. So somebody must have been the first one to come up with it. You 
look at it and [a certain stock] looks dirt cheap. So to be sure, you might talk with a couple of your 
friends at other hedge funds, go through the critical issues you are not sure of. You discuss it, see if 
you are not missing anything. Finally, you like it and invest in it. The other hedge fund managers are 
doing the same. By now, some brokers are seeing that hedge funds are [executing the trade] and start 
telling other similar hedge funds. That is where I think it becomes critical. These other hedge fund 
managers will analyze it. Because brokers will probably only mention what other hedge funds are 
doing but not why, and if they give you the why, it will be very general. So these other hedge funds 
will be doing their own research, talk to other hedge fund managers, etc., and if it makes sense, invest 
in it. If it does, you start having a consensus trade since at that stage everybody is talking about it: 
you, your friends, the brokers, other hedge fund managers and even [name of a television host on 
investments].’ 
This description captures dynamics witnessed frequently during our fieldwork. Hedge fund 
managers discussed, interpreted and scrutinized trading ideas with small groups of trusted hedge fund 
managers. For example, junior hedge fund managers shared ideas with ex-mentors, to test their 
validity; hedge fund managers revealed trading ideas to trusted peers aiming to get expert opinions 
about specific implications, the ideas were shared with other hedge fund managers who were 
considered smart. Overall, the findings above indicate that the communication practices that are 
exhibited as part of investment decision making in hedge funds also serve as an infrastructure that 
encourages the emergence of herding, where a number of hedge funds are holding the same or similar 
trades.  
Could the herding enabled by the structures and practices described so far, have wider market 
outcomes by affecting prices and risk? Evidential support for such a mechanism can only be drawn 
from observing a consensus trade over its lifecycle and documenting the surrounding communication 
from within several hedge funds. Fortunately, we had rare access to such an occurrence from January 
to October 2008, with several of the hedge funds in our sample holding the same ‘long-short’ 
Volkswagen-Porsche trade. This trading idea involved first, purchasing Porsche stock (the long 
component) and second, borrowing VW stock (the short component) and selling it immediately in the 
market. The stock is bought back later and returned to the lender. Clearly, the profitability of the trade 
is determined by the contemporaneous difference between the prices of VW and Porsche.  
Throughout the year, the popularity of the trade grew as brokers initially disseminated the 
broad idea and hedge fund managers we observed discussed the finer details amongst themselves. For 
example, the managers from our Figure 5 triad were all involved.  
Figure 5: VW-Porsche triad 
 
When concerns arose about the trade, we observed H16 calling H6 to discuss possible scenarios and 
action routes to avoid losses. Referring to one of the details discussed, H16 asked H6: ‘who could be 
in the know about that?’ When the conversation ended, we asked H16 about this query: 
 
Interviewer: ‘Couldn’t one of your brokers look this information up, may be by asking his lawyers or 
his own prime brokerage?’  
H16: ‘If I do this, they will use it as an argument to other hedge funds to close their positions, 
generating commissions and increase my losses.’ 
 
In the afternoon, H16 received a telephone call from H6, saying he had just spoken with H2. Even 
before H16 heard what H2 had to say, it was clear that he was relieved to hear the identity of the 
person with whom H6 shared the query. H6, H16 and H2 had all worked together at the same 
investment bank and knew each other well. Immediately after this call finished, H16 called H2, who 
was the source of the interpretation, discussed the matter in more depth and decided to stay in the 
trade.  
Eventually broker analysts began warning that there may not be enough VW stock available 
to cover the short positions. This warning was ignored by managers but in late October it was 
formally announced that only 5.8% of the shares were available for trading. The total amount of 
shares borrowed stood at 13%, which meant that many of the investors who held short positions 
would not be able to return the shares to the lenders, were they asked to do so. Indeed, lenders of the 
VW stock, concerned about the ability of the borrowers to return the stocks under these distressed 
conditions asked for the stock to be returned immediately. These requests, given the scarcity of VW 
stock, drove the prices up. This, in turn, increased the concerns and drove even more lenders to ask 
for their VW shares, resulting in the market price of VW stocks rising more than 6-fold in a few days   
The hedge funds we observed and that were involved in this trade, like many other long-short 
hedge funds, lost substantial amounts of money and some actually had to close. We were present at 
one of the hedge funds in late October, when it became apparent that the impact of the crisis was 
related directly to the structure of connections among hedge fund managers; H16 commented: ‘The 
problem is that we are all positioned the same way, every hedge fund manager I know is screaming 
for [Volkswagen] stock and just cannot get any. It is all exploding in our face’.  
 
Discussion and conclusions  
Earlier in the paper, we noted that we would examine communication and information-sharing 
practices amongst hedge funds and then use this empirical work to inform a theoretical discussion on 
collaborative decision-making, herding and whether over-embeddedness amongst hedge fund 
managers might impact on prices and risks in financial markets?  
The organizational literature stresses that economic activity is embedded in social connections 
(Granovetter, 1985) but the mainstream finance literature has typically ignored this notion as an 
explanation for financial market phenomena such as herding. Our interview and observational data 
confirms that the decision-making in the hedge fund industry, an industry that many consider 
emblematic of modern financial markets, is embedded in a network of social connections. In 
particular, we newly identify a two-tiered industry structure underpinned by two different sets of 
communication practices that the main types of actors follow. Specifically, we show that a hedge fund 
manager tends to maintain connections with other hedge fund managers, but is selective, preferring 
small and cohesive groups within which trading ideas are discussed at depth. By contrast, a broker 
maintains connections with as many hedge funds as possible, but not with other brokers. This tiered 
structure results from several factors including (i) brokers generate revenue primarily by executing 
trades for as many funds as possible (ii) hedge funds therefore don’t discuss detailed, interpretive 
trade information with brokers for fear that it will be passed onto many competitors and (iii) by 
contrast, hedge fund managers discuss such information and analysis with trusted competitors. This 
framework correlates with the distinction between embedded and arm’s length ties (Larson, 1992; 
Hansen, 1999; Lawrence et al. 2005; Uzzi, 1997, 1999).  
In light of our findings, we can now examine theoretically why hedge fund managers require 
these embedded ties. Such participants face a large decision space with frequent decisions to be made. 
One might expect hedge funds to try and have as many networked contacts as possible. However, 
corresponding with Podolny (2001), who regards network connections both as ‘pipes’ through which 
resources and information flow and also as ‘prisms’, connections through which actors facing 
uncertainty assess another actor’s quality, the number of connections is constrained by the need for 
these small firms to analyze and interpret, legitimize and confirm. This in turn reinforces the need for 
smaller, tight-net clusters of funds based on prior ties. This is expressed in our empirical findings 
where hedge fund managers repeatedly discuss the characteristics of networked members i.e., trust 
and smartness.  
To assess how these ties between hedge fund managers originate and develop, we construct a 
network of connections with historical-biographical data superimposed on each node. This reveals 
that competitor communication practices are rooted in common biographies which encompass prior 
experience of working together, common respect for the professional abilities or ‘smartness’ of each 
member of the tight-knit cluster, and shared cultural heritage such as language. When these historical-
biographical factors are reinforced by the frequent exchange of good trading ideas and analysis, a 
strong tie, underpinned by trust, is formed between hedge fund managers. It is this trust that can lead 
to herding and, ironically, also to additional risks.     
Although herding occurs in financial markets (Sias, 2004) and specifically, the hedge fund 
industry (Jiao and Ye, 2014), little evidence exists of any possible social mechanisms. Our evidence 
shows that the identified communication practices serve as an infrastructure for the emergence of 
popular consensus trades where a number of firms adopt the same trade or position. This 
phenomenon, which we term ‘expertise-based’ herding is different in motivation and process from 
those previously suggested in the finance literature. Exposed to uncertainty both due to the decision 
space and with regards to how able and trustworthy other actors are (Podolny, 2001), it is the close 
and ongoing co-operation demanded by ‘trusted and smart’ hedge fund managers to investigate 
complex trading ideas, that drives their similar trading positions, as opposed to concerns such as 
reputation or benchmarking. Moreover, brokers, observing only the manifestations of the hedge 
funds’ trading behavior (i.e. the actual trades but not the discussions leading to them) disseminate the 
notions among the other clusters of densely-connected hedge funds, turning relatively isolated trades 
into wider herding behavior and exacerbating market risks. We see this in the Porsche-VW case study, 
where a particular long-short trade was held by many hedge funds. Its very popularity meant that 
when hedge funds attempted to exit the trade at the same time, they could not, driving prices to record 
highs and causing hedge funds to incur substantial losses. 
A final question remains. During the Porsche-VW case study we noted that several brokers 
expressed concerns about the riskiness of the trade and yet, in spite of these, hedge funds continued to 
hold the positions. Why might investors like H16 miss or ignore relevant information? H16 belonged 
to a cluster of trusted hedge fund managers who created and maintained, we observed, a distributed 
decision making practice regarding the VW-Porsche trade. Even when it became apparent that the 
trade was riskier than initially appeared, H16 eschewed contacting brokers, in favour of conversations 
with H6 and H2. We suggest that such communication practices, which reflect expertise-based 
herding, may lead to the emergence of over-embeddedness (Uzzi, 1996; Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003) 
among hedge funds. That is, similarly-minded actors, appreciating each others’ intellectual capacities 
and integrity, increasingly circulate among themselves a limited set of ideas and views, which, in turn, 
become amplified due to repeated reassurance and lead the actors to become effectively insulated 
from relevant developments in other parts of the network. In other words, the two-tiered industry 
structure implies that hedge funds have a tendency to assign lesser weight to relevant and available 
information, when such information originates from brokers. This theoretical insight underpins an 
additional risk in financial market theory: the risk of disregarding relevant information from sources 
outside a trusted set of connections. 
We acknowledge a number or limitations of the study. First, our use of snowball sampling 
introduced the risk of missing relevant informants. Second, we examined the hedge fund industry 
during a particularly volatile period in the markets. Whilst we suggest that this encourages the type of 
communication practices we witnessed, we also need to be aware of the possibility that in calmer 
times, such practices may be less influential. Third, detailed numerical data for each and every trading 
position are held privately and are not available. Access to this data would allow us to further our 
investigations into the connections between communication practices and market impact.    
Our findings have implications at both the firm and regulatory level. Several of the hedge 
funds observed were interested in the outcomes of this research and in particular, how to assess their 
own ‘network risk’. A possible approach would be for individual funds to use the social network 
techniques used in this paper in a local sense; connections between hedge fund managers within the 
fund and those outside could be mapped and the strength of connections reviewed regularly. From an 
industry perspective, SEC regulations that follow the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 already require hedge funds to disclose details about their trading and 
investment positions and their valuation policies and practices (SEC, 2011). In a next step, and 
analogously to Basel II requirements on operational risk, regulators might also require funds to self-
report on their social networks, allowing them to build up a picture of social interrelationships and 
vulnerabilities within the industry cross-referenced with trading positions. Future regulation could 
therefore incorporate network risk, allowing the regulator to supervise and intervene in networks 
where necessary. This can also be supported by future research that follows our analysis and traces the 
linkages between the organizational practices of other financial market participants (e.g., foreign 
exchange or commodities traders) and financial phenomena like herding or speculative attacks.  
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